Option Generation in Simulated Conflict Scenarios in Approach Air Traffic Control by Kraemer, Jan & Süß, Heinz-Martin
Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Europe Chapter 2014 Annual 
Conference 
Human Factors in high reliability industries 
Edited by 
Dick de Waard, Jürgen Sauer, Stefan Röttger, Annette Kluge, Dietrich Manzey, 
Clemens Weikert, Antonella Toffetti, Rebecca Wiczorek, Karel Brookhuis, and 
Jettie Hoonhout 
ISSN 2333-4959 (online) 
 
 
Please refer to contributions as follows:  
[Authors] (2015), [Title]. In D. de Waard, J. Sauer, S. Röttger, A. Kluge, D. 
Manzey, C. Weikert, A. Toffetti, R. Wiczorek, K. Brookhuis, and H. Hoonhout  
(Eds.). Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Europe Chapter 
2014 Annual Conference (pp. pagenumbers). Downloaded from http://hfes-
europe.org  (ISSN 2333-4959) 
 
 
 
 
Available as open source download  
Published by HFES 
In D. de Waard, J. Sauer, S. Röttger, A. Kluge, D. Manzey, C. Weikert, A. Toffetti, R. Wiczorek, K. 
Brookhuis, and H. Hoonhout  (Eds.) (2015). Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 
Europe Chapter 2014 Annual Conference. ISSN 2333-4959 (online). Available from http://hfes-
europe.org 
Option generation in simulated conflict scenarios in 
approach Air Traffic Control 
Jan Kraemer1 & Heinz-Martin Süß2 
1DLR Braunschweig  
 2Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg  
Germany 
  Abstract 
Approach air traffic controllers provide safe guidance of aircraft approaching an 
airport from different arrival routes. Handling traffic and preventing separation loss 
between aircraft requires controllers to maintain situation awareness at all times. In 
case an incident is foreseen, guidance options must be acquired to deal with it. 
Though expert controllers are expected to always come up immediately with the best 
guidance options, option generation skills have often been neglected in situation 
awareness research so far. In addition, the fact that incidents still happen in air 
traffic control shows the need for research in this field. In an initial investigation 
study, seven expert air traffic controllers completed an online-survey consisting of 
videos and screenshots captured from three real-time simulations of approach 
scenarios on Düsseldorf airport, Germany. Every scenario was designed to end in 
separation loss of two aircraft. In each scenario, subjects were asked to provide as 
many options as possible to deal with the situation one minute prior to the incident. 
Results showed differences between experts regarding the quality and quantity of 
options successfully preventing separation loss given in the scenarios, indicating 
different strategies of dealing with conflict situations among subjects. 
Introduction 
Air travel is considered the safest mode of transportation (IATA, 2013). However, 
accidents still occur and with the constant growth of air traffic over the last years, 
the number of incidents related to air traffic management (ATM) has also increased. 
Statistics revealed a number of over 120 incidents per two billion flight hours in 
2012 (Eurocontrol, 2013). As recent forecasts of IATA expect a total of 3.6 billion 
flight passengers in 2016, about 800 million more than in 2011(IATA, 2012), the 
number of incidents is likely to keep growing. Highly skilled air traffic controllers 
are needed to manage complex traffic caused by growing numbers of aircraft and to 
ensure safe guidance. Safety is granted by maintaining horizontal and vertical 
separation between aircraft within the same sector. Additionally, compliance with 
limitations in altitude and flight speed must be controlled at all times. Therefore, 
controllers constantly have to make decisions to provide safe guidance. In 2012, 
there have been 125 separation minima infringements per million aircraft 
movements (Eurocontrol, 2013). To prevent further increase, it is important to 
identify the sources of human error in the decision making process. 
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Decision making is a cognitive process used to find the most suitable course of 
action (COA) among alternatives to meet a certain goal (Wang & Ruhe, 2007). 
Feasible COAs are derived from careful analysis of the situation dealt with. 
Analysing a situation’s state and figuring out what to do is called Situation 
Awareness (SAw; Adam, 1993). More detailed, SAw has been defined as “the 
perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, 
the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near 
future” (Endsley, 1988, p. 97). Therefore, proper SAw is necessary to select the 
most suitable COA from a number of possible ones depending on one’s objective 
(Endsley, 1999a). It enables an operator to anticipate the situation’s future state and 
to direct subsequently encoding and pattern recognition accordingly (Durso, Rawson 
& Girotto, 2007). Knowledge about the future state has been shown to reveal the 
biggest differences in SAw of experts and novices (Durso et al., 1995) and is 
considered to be a distinct ability of skilled experts (Endsley, 2000) 
Maintaining SAw while dealing with complex dynamic situations is important for 
good performance. Loss of SAw has been identified as the source of operational 
errors in air traffic control (ATC). 58.6% of operational errors in Terminal Radar 
Approach Control and 69.1% in enroute ATC are caused by insufficient SAw 
(Endsley, 1999). As SAw involves the construction of (partially) internal 
representations of highly complex situations, it puts effort into cognitive resources 
such as working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) and attention (Durso et al., 
2007). Furthermore, the dynamics of moving objects require continuous updating of 
those representations as the situation changes over time. SAw may be lost if 
complexity and dynamics exceed the capabilities of the operator’s attention and 
working memory capacity, as both are limited resources (Endsley, 1988). 
Expertise can reduce the effect of limited cognitive resources on SAw (Durso & 
Gronlund, 1999). Subject-matter experts develop internal models from experience 
which help them to guide their attention, to organise information and to project 
future states of the situation at hand (Endsley, 1998). Those internal models are 
stored in long-term memory and can be activated and integrated with situation 
models stored in working memory (Durso et al., 2007). As they are treated as a 
single piece of information, they may greatly reduce the demands of storing complex 
information patterns (Sweller, 2003). Sohn and Doane (2004) found that expert 
pilots relied on their skills built from experience when recalling flight situations 
from given cockpit perspectives, while novice subjects’ performance was 
determinate by their working memory capacity. 
An operator needs to know his options to adequately deal with a given situation. 
Confronted with familiar situations, experts are believed to come up with optimal 
COAs from experience without having to rely on further processing (Pfaff et al., 
2013). Unfamiliar situations, on the other hand, call for more complex processing if 
they cannot sufficiently be mapped to prior experience. According to Wang and 
Ruhe (2007), setting a goal triggers an exhaustive search for possible COAs and 
criteria distinguishing between useful decision-strategies. This is also known as 
decision space (DS). It results from transforming raw information from SAw to 
actual COAs (Drury, Pfaff, More, & Klein, 2009). By analysing the potential costs 
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and outcomes of available options, operators eventually decide on the most suitable 
one. In emergency response decision making research, assistance systems have been 
developed to help decision makers to find available COAs and compare them in 
terms of possible outcomes (Chandrasekaran, 2007). Using exploratory algorithms, 
such systems are designed to reduce the effects of uncertainty and time pressure in 
complex dynamic situations on the operator’s performance. They provide the 
decision maker with all possible COAs, their respective outcomes and possible risks 
and robustness over a variety of conditions (Pfaff et al., 2013). It has been shown 
that such systems can improve both the accuracy and speed of identifying robust 
decisions from a set of alternatives (Lempert, Popper & Banks, 2003, cited by Pfaff 
et al., 2013). 
Constructing the DS of an operator requires proper SAw and involves knowledge 
and expertise. SAw is affected by limited cognitive resources and must be 
maintained at all times to handle complex dynamic situations. Furthermore, 
decisions must often be made under time pressure. Given unlimited time to analyse a 
situation without having to memorise all the details, subject-matter experts should be 
able to build up sufficient SAw to deal with the situation. Thus, in combination with 
their expertise, they should be able to provide an enclosing set of possible COAs. In 
highly standardised and regulated fields such as ATC, DS are expected to bear a 
close resemblance among experts, because explicit rules can put an external limit to 
the possible options a decision maker has to find and compare. The aim of this study 
was to find out if experts are actually able to generate encompassing DS if they have 
both unlimited time and access to all relevant information. Under these conditions 
experts are believed not to differ in conflict resolution performance among each 
other. Thus, no significant differences between experts are expected in terms of both 
quality and quantity of their decisions.  
  Methods 
  Subjects 
Ten approach and one tower air traffic controller (10 male, 1 female) from Deutsche 
Flugsicherung (DFS) participated in the experiment. Age ranged from 23 to 51 years 
(M = 32.82, SD = 8.55) while years of experience ranged from 2 to 20 years (M = 
8.36, SD = 6.23). Subjects were recruited by direct advertisement via the internal 
network of DFS. Participation was voluntary, no expense allowance was paid. 
  Conflict resolution task 
Subjects were asked to provide as many solutions as possible for conflict scenarios 
in simulated approach ATC. A computer based survey was created containing three 
short real-time simulated scenarios of approaching air traffic on Düsseldorf airport 
(EDDL), Germany. Scenarios were created using NLR ATM Research Simulator 
(NARSIM; ten Have, 1993), a real-time ATM simulator software developed by the 
National Airspace Laboratory of the Netherlands. Scenarios showed aircraft 
approaching Düsseldorf Airport via Standard Arrival Routes using conventional 
Transition To Final procedures (see Figure 1). Scenarios each lasted between four 
and five minutes and were designed to end in separation loss between two aircraft. 
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Videos of the simulation runs were recorded using desktop capturing software. 
Additionally, screenshots of the situation one minute prior to separation loss were 
captured with the respective aircraft highlighted. 
Each item was introduced by a short description of the situation at hand including 
the time at which the conflict occurred as well as the conflicting aircraft. Underneath 
the introduction, the video and the screenshot of the current conflict scenario were 
embedded. Subjects were asked to watch the videos as well as the screenshots 
carefully and to find as many solutions as possible to prevent the upcoming 
separation loss one minute before it occurred. Separated pre-labelled tables were 
presented on the same page to write down advisories that would be given to the 
aircraft. All advisories written in one table represented one COA. Subjects were 
allowed to advise changes to flight speed and altitude of aircraft and to turn aircraft 
from the downwind to the centreline. Additionally, subjects were asked to rate if 
they would personally use each option in reality on a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(never) to 7 (absolutely). Subjects were allowed to watch the videos and screenshots 
as often as they wanted and to switch back and forth between the scenarios to find as 
many options as possible. 
Several simplifications were set in the simulation to make answers more 
comparable. All aircraft were set to the same type. No differences in horizontal 
separation had to be considered between different wake turbulence categories and no 
wind was present. All aircraft followed the approach procedure as described. 
  Procedure 
The conflict resolution task was presented as an online survey. First, a biographical 
questionnaire was completed. Following the questionnaire, general instructions were 
presented, involving information about aircraft types, conventional approach 
procedure, how to change video settings and to fill out the direction tables. 
Furthermore, subjects were assured that no data could later be linked to a specific 
person. Thereafter subjects completed the questionnaires as described. 
  Data analysis 
Validation of the options provided by the participants was done by replaying the 
scenarios once for each answer. One minute prior to the separation loss, the 
simulation was paused and all advisories for one solution were put into the 
simulation. If the separation loss was prevented successfully, the respective option 
was scored with one point. If any violations of limitations to speed and altitude were 
made, half a point was given. Zero points were given if the conflict still occurred or 
new conflicts were produced. Options were categorized by combinations of 
directions given. This way, small deviations in absolute values assigned between 
subjects did not count as distinct options. 
  Results 
Subjects provided a total of 12 original options in total for scenario one. Ten options 
were found in scenario two and seven in scenario three. Descriptive statistics of 
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valid options provided per subject in each scenario are presented in Table 1. No 
significant deviations from either uniform or normal distribution were found using 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Tests in any scenario. Paired t-tests showed significant 
deviations of mean numbers of valid options per subject from total valid options 
provided by all subjects in scenario one (t(10) = -28.03, p < .001), two (t(10) = -
33.80, p < .001) and three (t(9) = -21.10, p < .001). 
 
 
In order to take differences in experience into account, subjects were divided into 
two groups by median split (Mdn = 6). A 3x2 ANOVA with scenarios as within-
subject factor and experience (low vs. high) as between-subject factor revealed 
significant differences in the total number of options provided per subject among 
scenarios (F(2, 18) = 7.43, p = .005, η² = .48). Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected paired 
t-tests showed no significant differences between scenarios. No significant effects of 
scenarios (F(2, 18) = 2.87, p = .086) or experience (F < 1) on mean numbers of valid 
Figure 1. Schematic depiction of conventional Transition To Final procedure at Düsseldorf 
Airport (EDDL), Germany 
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options were found. No significant correlation between experience and valid options 
were found throughout scenarios (rs = .22, p = .257). 
Table 1. Distribution of valid options provided per scenario (Top – Total number of 
valid options provided over all subjects, % valid – percentage of valid answers 
given, KS-Z Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Z values of tests for uniform distribution) 
Scenario Top MD SD % valid Min. Max. KS-Z p 
1 12 2.0 1.2 70.9 0.0 4.0 0.53 .943 
2 10 1.2 0.8 46.2 0.0 2.5 0.63 .819 
3 7 1.5 0.8 72.5 0.0 3.0 0.74 .648 
 
Frequencies of common options provided by subjects were counted for each 
scenario (see Figure 1). Out of the 12 options in scenario one, four options were 
stated by more than two participants. One option out of ten in scenario two and three 
out of seven options in scenario three were used more than twice. 
No significant correlation between ratings and validity of options were found among 
scenarios (r(75) = -.05, p = .348). Paired t-tests between mean ratings of valid and 
invalid options showed significantly higher ratings of valid options in scenario two 
(t(5) = 4.72, p = .005, d = 1.42). No significant differences of mean ratings were 
found in scenario one (t(2) = -0.28, p = .808, d = -0.17) and three (t(3) = -2.85, p = 
.065, d = -1.88) Out of the eight common options used by three or more subjects, 
ratings of four solutions differed no more than two points. Ranges in the remaining 
options went up to a maximum of five points. 
  Discussion 
It was expected that various subject-matter experts would provide highly similar sets 
of possible COAs when confronted with the same conflict scenarios. Data showed 
that this is not the case, even though Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Tests showed no 
significant differences in quantity of given and valid answers. As no deviation from 
standard distribution was found as well, the results indicate that the tests lacked 
significance due to the low power arising from the small sample. Various experts 
came up with a lot of different solutions to the same situation. Furthermore, none 
were even close to providing all possible solutions in any scenario. While a total of 
12, ten and seven different options were given in total, the maximum number of 
experts sharing one option was never higher than four among scenarios. Moreover, 
some high differences between ratings for the same options were found among 
subjects. This is surprising considering that all of the participants were highly 
trained professional air traffic controllers. Insufficient SAw as a cause of error was 
unlikely as unlimited time was given to solve each scenario and all relevant 
information was accessible throughout the task. Additionally, no information had to 
be memorized over longer periods of time because videos and screenshots could be 
watched repeatedly. Nevertheless, subjects not only failed to provide complete DS 
but even produced invalid solutions which did not solve the respective conflicts. 
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As subjects’ experience covered a range of 18 years, this might explain differences 
in DS. As experience and knowledge were discussed as important factors in 
acquiring SAw, an increasing number of correct answers would be expected with 
higher experience. However, the data do not support this explanation as no higher 
scores were found for the more experienced subjects. Nevertheless, it should be kept 
in mind that this might stem from the small sample, namely the lack of statistical 
power as mentioned. In a larger sample, experience might make a difference when it 
comes to finding solutions in emergency situations. 
The available advisories and simplifications used during the experiment may 
pinpoint another explanation for the differences in experts’ DS. Some subjects 
criticised the lack of heading advisories claiming that this eliminated possible 
options. In that case, experts should have been even more likely to produce similar 
sets of COAs due to the reduced amount of options left. The low level of compliance 
found among the answers provided throughout the experiment contradicts this point. 
Although options were excluded from the start, subjects still came up with a lot of 
different approaches to the same problems and differed strongly in both quantity and 
quality of their answers. Allowing for more directions might have resulted in even 
bigger variance of both. Unfortunately, it was not possible to test this supposition 
with the acquired data. 
The low number of options may result from subjects tending to provide only robust 
COAs instead of encompassing DS. It has been argued that optimal COAs are 
almost impossible to find in complex dynamic situations due to their high levels of 
uncertainty and time pressure (Lempert et al., 2003, cited by Pfaff et al., 2013). 
Therefore, decision makers tend to make robust decisions which maintain their 
effectiveness over a wider range of possible outcomes and conditions in emergency 
situations (Bryant & Lempert, 2010). However, two findings in this experiment 
contradict this explanation. First, subjects were only watching a simulation and were 
given as much time as they wanted to produce their answers. Therefore, it is unlikely 
that time pressure kept them from thinking all their options through or rushed them 
towards making decisions. Second, subjects also provided options rated with only 
two points (very unlikely), meaning they gave an answer they would not really use 
in a real-world situation. 
Subjects may have provided fewer answers than they could possibly have due to 
lack of motivation. As the task required them to rethink a situation over and over to 
come up with new ideas, this might have reduced compliance with the task over time 
even though participation was voluntary. Indeed, the descending number of total 
options provided per subject among scenarios indicates loss of motivation 
throughout the task. On the contrary, no decrease in valid options was found 
between scenarios. Loss of motivation may explain why fewer answers were 
provided in the last scenario. However, it does not explain why the quality of the 
answers did not drop over scenarios. Due to anonymity, contacting participants in 
order to confront them with the results and ask about problems afterwards was 
impossible. Future studies of this kind could be combined with post experimental 
interviews to allow for more detailed explanations of strategies used to identify 
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possible COAs. Additionally, allowing subjects to further explain their answers 
might help to keep up motivation throughout the task. 
It has been argued that current air traffic systems will not be able to cope with 
projected increases in air traffic due to lack of flexibility (Lohr & Williams, 2008, 
cited by Pfaff et al., 2013). Assistance systems which have been developed and are 
already in use by some air navigation service providers may help air traffic 
controllers to overcome this problem by providing a broader range of COAs (Pfaff et 
al., 2013). Looking at the data, the question arises if such systems should already be 
mandatory for emergency decision making in ATC. Although unlimited time was 
given to solve each scenario, subjects still produced invalid answers which didn’t 
prevent the conflicts. In addition, in each scenario at least one subject failed to 
produce any valid options at all. In future studies, it would be interesting to compare 
the DS of human experts directly to emergency assistance systems which make use 
of robust decision making processes. If all possible COAs and their estimated 
outputs were derived from modelling processes, it could be tested if human experts 
are able to provide a similar set of answers. Additionally, it could be examined if DS 
of human experts, although they may be smaller in quantity, are representing the 
most robust COAs found by the assistance systems. Unfortunately, such systems 
were not available in this study. Furthermore, although it has been argued that lack 
of SAw was an unlikely cause of error in this study, this cannot be ruled out. Future 
work should include the assessment of SAw data using probe methods such as the 
Situation Present Assessment Method (Durso, Blackley & Dattel, 2006) to draw 
more resilient conclusions about Saw and DS generation. 
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